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Customized Medicine and the Limits
of Federal Regulatory Power
Anna B. Laakmann*
ABSTRACT
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays a dominant
role in setting national policy and standards for the biomedical
industry. Yet there are significant statutory constraints on the agency's
power. The FDA's main implementing statute, the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), bounds the scope of the FDA's regulatory
authority. The FDCA cabins FDA power in two important ways: (1)
with a few notable exceptions, the FDA lacks power to regulate local
activities that are not directly connected to interstate commerce, and (2)
the agency may regulate product manufacturers, but not service
providers. The FDA has long grappled with the limits of its authority
to regulate conduct that encompasses the practice of medicine or the
practice of pharmacy, such as physician off-label prescribing and drug
compounding. These tensions will intensify as the life science industry
evolves from a mass-market distribution scheme to a more customized,
service-oriented business model. Autologous stem cell therapies and
3D-printed drugs and devices are two prominent examples of medical
innovation that may evade the FDA's purview. Sophisticated,
organized patient advocacy groups that develop and share
individualized treatments further expose the limits of the FDA's
statutory authority. These technological and social changes in medical
product development and dissemination raise profound questions
about the FDA's future place within our contemporary healthcare
regulatory system.
* Of Counsel, Greenberg Traurig. J.D., Stanford University; M.D., University of
Pennsylvania; B.A., Williams College. The Article reflects the personal views and opinions of the
author and does not necessarily represent the views or opinions of Greenberg Traurig or any of
its clients. Associate Professor, Department of Finance, New Mexico State University.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers have long
been subject to comprehensive federal regulation. The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA or "the Act"),' enacted in 1938 and
strengthened by numerous subsequent amendments, dictates national
policy and standards for the biomedical industry.2 The FDCA gives
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) enormous power to
determine which products are brought to market and how those
products are manufactured, promoted, and distributed to hospitals,
physicians, and patients.3  However, the FDA's jurisdiction is
1. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
2. CAROLYN ALENCI ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 3-5 (David G.
Adams, Richard M. Cooper, Martin J. Hahn, Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 3rd ed. 2015) (listing the
principal amendments to the FDCA).
3. Id. at 2 (summarizing the FDA's activities, which include, inter alia, reviewing
applications to market new products or make changes to existing products, assessing reports and
data on the safety of marketed products, inspecting factories and goods offered for importation,
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statutorily confined to the regulation of manufacturers and
distributors that introduce products into interstate commerce.4 The
agency generally lacks authority to regulate purely intrastate or
noncommercial activities.5 Further, it may not interfere with the
practice of medicine or the practice of pharmacy in ways that unduly
conflict with the states' historical enforcement of their plenary police
powers.6
The dividing line between FDA-regulated product
manufacturers, on the one hand, and healthcare service providers
outside the scope of the FDA's purview, on the other, has always been
important and contested. This legal, distinction will become
increasingly significant as the life science industry evolves from a
mass-market distribution scheme toward a more customized,
service-oriented business model. Emerging technologies, such as
autologous stem cell therapies and 3D-printed drugs and devices,
coupled with unprecedented patient participation in product
development and dissemination, blur the lines between medical
technology creators and users.7 As the boundaries between product
manufacturers, service providers, and consumers become increasingly
uncertain, so too does the scope of federal regulatory power. These
technological and social developments raise profound questions about
the FDA's role in our contemporary healthcare regulatory system.
II. REQUISITE NEXUS TO INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The US Constitution grants Congress power "[t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes."" Since the 1940s, the Supreme Court has
construed the Commerce Clause broadly.9 In addition to regulating
the channels of interstate commerce, and persons and things therein,
Congress has authority to regulate activities that "substantially
affect" interstate commerce.10  The Court has upheld federal
restrictions on conduct that takes place wholly within a state, such as
reviewing promotional materials, taking enforcement actions based upon such reviews and
inspections, and developing regulations and guidance documents relating to products within its
jurisdiction).
4. See infra pp. 287-88.
5. See infra p. 288.
6. See infra p. 293.
7. See infra pp. 293-312.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
9. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
10. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
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the intrastate sale of milk," the cultivation of wheat for personal
consumption,12 and racial discrimination by restaurants frequented
only by local customers.13 Most recently, the Court decided that the
federal Department of Justice has commerce power to ban the
intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana authorized by state
law for personal medical purposes.14  The Supreme Court's
constitutional interpretation thus provides Congress wide berth to
regulate local, noncommercial activities that have only a nominal or
indirect connection to interstate commerce.
Yet Congress often refrains from extending its legislative reach
to the constitutionally permissible bounds of its authority, and federal
agencies' regulatory jurisdiction extends only to the statutory
parameters defined by Congress. Indeed, the FDCA falls significantly
short of the outer limits of the federal commerce power.15 Statutory
constraints on FDA authority reflect longstanding concerns about
federal interference with the states' regulation of the practice of
medicine and the practice of pharmacy.
A. Local Distribution
In 1942, the Supreme Court, in Wickard v. Filburn,
expansively construed the Commerce Clause to uphold federal
regulation of homegrown, home-consumed wheat.16  The Court
affirmed this sweeping view of the Commerce Clause in 2005, holding
in Gonzales v. Raich that the federal government could enforce the
Controlled Substances Act against parties who cultivated or possessed
locally grown marijuana for personal use.17 But Congress enacted the
FDCA in 1938,18 four years before Wickard, at a time when then-
prevailing Supreme Court jurisprudence imposed meaningful limits
on the commerce power. Taking account of presumed constitutional
constraints, the 1938 Congress restricted the scope of the FDCA to
products that moved in interstate commerce.19 The statutory limits on
11. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121 (1942).
12. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
13. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964).
14. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005).
15. See supra pp. 87-88.
16. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
17. Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
18. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399f
(2012)).
19. PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A. GROSSmAN, FOOD AND DRUG
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 271-72 (4th ed. 2014) ("The scope of the [FDCA] is largely limited to
products that have moved, are moving, or will be moving in interstate commerce. This is hardly
surprising, for when the Act was enacted in 1938, the Supreme Court had only just begun to
288 [Vol. XIX:2:285
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the FDA's regulatory authority are, therefore, more significant than
the constitutional limits under modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
In the years since Wickard, Congress has expanded the FDA's
statutory jurisdiction to cover some intrastate activities. Congress
revised the FDCA in 1948 to clarify that its prohibitions against
adulteration and misbranding apply to articles that are held for sale
within a state after being shipped in interstate commerce.20
Amendments to the FDCA promulgated in 1976 permit the FDA to
seize misbranded or adulterated medical devices without proof that
they have traveled in interstate commerce.21 The FDA also has
authority under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to prohibit false
labeling of biological products whether or not they move in interstate
commerce,22 and section 361 of the PHSA authorizes FDA regulation
to prevent the spread of communicable disease without any interstate
commerce limitations.23 However, despite these extensions of FDA
jurisdiction, the agency lacks statutory authority to regulate a large
swath of wholly intrastate conduct.
While the FDCA's adulteration and misbranding prohibitions
apply to actions that are taken after an article has traveled in
interstate commerce, the Act's "new drug" provisions apply only to the
introduction of products into interstate commerce.24  The FDCA
breathe life into the commerce power."). The FDCA defines interstate commerce as "commerce
between any State or Territory and any place outside thereof." See 21 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012).
20. As enacted in 1938, section 304(a) of the FDCA authorized the seizure of articles
that were adulterated or misbranded "when introduced into or when in interstate commerce." 52
Stat. 1040, 1044. In 1946, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this provision did not
empower the government to seize adulterated pasta that was sitting in a warehouse after
traveling in interstate commerce. United States v. Phelps Dodge Mercantile Co., 157 F.2d 453
(9th Cir. 1946). In response, Congress amended section 304(a) in 1948 to also permit the seizure
of an article that is adulterated or misbranded "while held for sale (whether or not the first sale)
after shipment in interstate commerce." See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 277;
see also FDCA § 301(k), 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (2012) (prohibiting any act that results in an article
being adulterated or misbranded "if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether
or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce").
21. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 272; 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(2) (2012).
22. PHSA § 351(b), 42 U.S.C. § 262(b) (2012); see also United States v. Calise, 217 F.
Supp. 705, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (concluding that the mislabeling ban of 42 U.S.C. § 262(b)
extends further in scope than the labeling requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2012) ("The Surgeon General, with the approval of the Secretary,
is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary to prevent
the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into
the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.").
The FDA assumed responsibility for implementing the PHSA provisions pertaining to biological
products in 1972. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 272.
24. 21 U.S.C. § 331(d) (2012) (prohibiting the introduction or delivery into interstate
commerce of an article in violation of § 355); 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012) ("No person shall
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any [unapproved] new drug."). The
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defines a "new drug" as "[a]ny drug. . . the composition of which is
such that such drug is not generally recognized, among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety
and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling
thereof."25 A manufacturer cannot market a new drug without first
obtaining FDA approval of a new drug application (NDA). 26 Since the
FDCA prohibits the interstate shipment of any unapproved new drug,
manufacturers must obtain an exemption from this prohibition in
order to supply drugs to researchers who conduct the clinical trials
required to gain FDA approval.27
Physicians do not violate the new drug provisions when they
prescribe drugs for unapproved, "off-label" purposes.28 This is dictated
by the statutory interstate commerce limitation. When a physician
prescribes a drug for an unapproved use, the drug usually meets the
statutory definition of a "new drug," since it is not generally
recognized by experts as safe and effective for that indication.29
However, as the FDA has noted, "[u]nlike the adulteration and
misbranding provisions of the Act, the new drug provisions apply only
at the moment of shipment in interstate commerce."30 Hence, the
licensing requirement for new biological products similarly applies only to articles "introduce[d]
or deliver[ed] for introduction into interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2012).
25. FDCA § 201(p)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(1) (2012).
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2012).
27. Section 505(i) of the FDCA permits the FDA to allow manufacturers to ship
unapproved new drugs in interstate commerce for investigational purposes only. FDCA § 505(i),
21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (2012). The procedure the FDA has created to implement this exemption is the
investigational new drug application (IND), governed by 21 C.F.R. Pt. 312. Investigational
biologics are subject to the FDCA's IND requirements. 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(a) (2016). Medical
device investigations are subject to a separate process called the Investigational Device
Exemption (IDE). FDCA § 520(g), 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g) (2012).
28. FDA regulations exempt from the IND requirements the use in the practice of
medicine of an approved drug for an unlabeled indication. 21 C.F.R. § 312.2(d) (2016). The only
drug for which Congress has specifically prohibited off-label prescribing is human growth
hormone (HGH). See 21 U.S.C. § 333(e)(1) (2012) (making it a criminal offense for a physician to
distribute HGH for any use other than an FDA-approved use). Congress enacted this provision in
1990 out of concerns about unsafe use of HGH to enhance athletic performance. See infra p. 293.
29. See Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 632 (1973)
(concluding "that a drug can be 'generally recognized' by experts as effective for intended use
within the meaning of the [FDCA] only when that expert consensus is founded upon 'substantial
evidence' as defined in §505(d)"). Section 505(d) of the FDCA establishes the standard for
approval of a NDA and requires "evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations." FDCA § 505(d), 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(e) (2016)
("Uncontrolled studies or partially controlled studies are not acceptable as the sole basis for the
approval of claims of effectiveness.").
30. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972)
(rule not adopted).
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FDCA's new drug provisions are no longer applicable once an
approved drug lawfully travels in interstate commerce and lands on
the shelf of a local pharmacy or physician's office.31
A physician who acts outside the doctor-patient relationship to
sell a drug for an unapproved purpose may violate the new drug
requirements because, in that case, the physician is considered a
person in the chain of distribution.32 The FDCA also prohibits the
intrastate manufacture and administration of an unapproved drug or
device made from components that have traveled in interstate
commerce.33 And anyone who distributes a drug that has traveled in
interstate commerce is subject to the FDCA's adulteration and
misbranding prohibitions.34 But a physician who merely prescribes a
drug for an off-label use as part of the practice of medicine commits no
violation of the FDCA because a prescriber who acts in the context of a
doctor-patient relationship is not considered a person in the chain of
distribution.35
Statutory limitations similarly constrain the FDA's authority
to regulate the local distribution of medical devices. Like the new
drug provision, the requirement for premarket device approval applies
to devices that are introduced into interstate commerce.36 Although
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 gave the FDA the power to
31. Id.
32. See id. (explaining that, while a physician is permitted to prescribe off-label, "where
a manufacturer or his representative, or any person in the chain of distribution, does anything
that directly or indirectly suggests to the [treating] physician or to the patient that an approved
drug may be properly used for unapproved uses for which it is neither labeled nor advertised,
that action constitutes a direct violation of the Act and is punishable accordingly") (emphasis
added).
33. See Baker v. United States, 932 F.2d 813, 814 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
FDCA's "drug" definition includes "articles intended for use as a component of' a recognized
drug, therefore "the 'shipment in interstate commerce' requirement is satisfied even when only
an ingredient is transported interstate"); Retkwa v. Orentreich, 579 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1991)
(holding that physicians who received an interstate shipment of nonmedical grade silicone and
compounded the silicone for use in cosmetic procedures violated the FDCA's prohibition against
selling an unapproved medical device); United States v. Dianovin Pharm., Inc., 475 F.2d 100 (1st
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973) (upholding the district court's determination that a
drug manufacturer's use of the raw material vitamin K, which had been shipped in interstate
commerce, to make an injectable drug solely for local consumption was governed by the FDCA
because articles intended for use as components of a drug are also defined as drugs).
34. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1044 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 334
(2012)).
35. HuTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 820 ("Although a physician does not
violate section 505 of the [FDCA] by prescribing an approved new drug for an unapproved use, a
physician who distributes either unapproved drugs or approved drugs for unapproved uses is
fully subject to the requirements of section 505."); see also infra pp. 292-96.
36. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b) (2012) (authorizing the Secretary to require premarket
approval of class III devices that were introduced into interstate commerce before May 28, 1976,
and devices that are substantially equivalent to such devices).
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seize adulterated or misbranded devices without regard to interstate
commerce, the agency cannot impose criminal penalties or obtain an
injunction absent an interstate commerce connection.37  Congress
included a provision in the Device Amendments that relieves the
government of the burden of establishing an interstate commerce
connection in criminal and injunction proceedings.38 But the provision
only creates a rebuttable presumption,39 so a defendant who can show
that neither the allegedly nonconforming product nor any of its
components traveled in interstate commerce avoids penalty (other
than product seizure) under the FDCA.
B. Noncommercial Activities
In addition to crossing state lines at some point in its
distribution, a drug or device must be "held for sale" in order for the
FDA to have statutory authority over those who distribute it.40 This
statutory limit prevents the FDA from banning noncommercial
distribution of drugs and devices, even if the agency can show that the
products (or their components) have moved in interstate commerce.4 1
As explained above, the FDA does have authority to seize adulterated
or misbranded devices, regardless of their connection to interstate
commerce.42 And the FDA has unlimited statutory authority under
the PHSA to regulate in order to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases.43 But the FDA cannot enjoin or punish individuals who
37. HuTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 285 (noting that the Medical Device
Amendments do not authorize criminal penalties or injunctive relief absent proof that a device
traveled in interstate commerce).
38. Id. at 286 ("[T]he Device Amendments added a new section 709 to the Act, which
provided: 'In any action to enforce the requirements of this Act respecting a device the connection
to interstate commerce required for jurisdiction in such action shall be presumed to exist."')
Further, in 1997, Congress extended this provision to cover food, drugs, and cosmetics, as well.
Id.
39. Id.
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (2012) (prohibiting any act that causes a regulated product to
become adulterated or misbranded, "if such act is done while such article is held for sale
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce") (emphasis added).
41. See id.
42. See supra pp. 287-89; see also United States v. Olsen, 161 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir.
1947) (reversing the district court's dismissal of the government's seizure of a device in the
appellee's private home, because the device allegedly had been misbranded prior to its shipment
in interstate commerce and "[i]t is immaterial . . . that appellee did not intend to use it
commercially or to permit its use by persons other than himself and his mother and brothers").
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (a) (2012) ("The Surgeon General, with the approval of the
Secretary, is authorized to make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are necessary
to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign




engage in the noncommercial exchange of drugs and devices that
allegedly violate the FDCA's new drug, misbranding, or adulteration
provisions.
This statutory limit on the FDA's authority hovered at the
margins of a contentious political battle between the agency and
nonprofit organizations that facilitated access to unapproved drugs at
the height of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s and 1990s. The FDA
elicited public backlash when it acted to stop two companies from
selling a substance made from eggs and soybeans that, although
marketed as a food, was promoted as an AIDS treatment by activists
who had formed a network of buyers' clubs.4 4  The agency ceased
regulatory action in response to the protests.4 5 FDA Commissioner
Frank Young later declared in a conciliatory speech: "FDA's new
policy regarding self-help, nonprofit clinics is similar to our policy
regarding the use of unproven substances in self-treatment-that is,
not to interfere as long as patients are not being harmed, clinics do not
promote unproven products outside the clinic, and the clinic does not
serve as a subterfuge for a commercial enterprise."4 6
While not ceding its regulatory authority, the FDA sought to
draw a clear policy line between nonprofit and for-profit distribution of
unapproved drugs.47 However, the agency was later forced to squarely
confront the "held for sale" statutory limitation in an unusual case
involving gratuitous drug distribution. In United States v. Geborde,
the FDA levied a misbranding charge against an individual who had
manufactured and freely given to several teenagers a homemade
designer drug called gamma hydroxy butyrate, commonly known as
GHB. 48  Geborde did not dispute that his conduct had a sufficient
interstate nexus to support an FDCA violation.4 9 Though the GHB
never traveled in interstate commerce, the ingredients that Geborde
44. Gina Kolata, An Angry Response to Actions on AIDS Spurs F.D.A. Shift, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/26/us/an-angry-response-to-actions-on-aids-
spurs-fda-shift.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/RKR6-BVBR].
45. Id. ("[T]he agency called off the embargo and informed Nutricology that if it would
comply with agency regulations and stop implying that the substance is useful against AIDS, it
could resume selling the product.").
46. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 770.
47. In contrast to its forbearance toward nonprofit AIDS organizations, during the same
period the FDA aggressively pursued for-profit clinics distributing unapproved cancer drugs. See,
e.g., United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1987).
48. United States v. Geborde, 278 F.3d 926, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that the
government sought a conviction under the FDCA because, at the time that Geborde distributed
the drug, GHB was not listed as a controlled substance and thus the government could not bring
a conventional drug case).
49. Id. at 930.
2016] 293
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used to make it presumably did.50 But the Ninth Circuit overturned
Geborde's misbranding conviction, concluding that the government
had failed to prove the "held for sale" statutory element of the
offense.5 1 The court rejected the government's position that the FDCA
covered all articles not intended solely for personal consumption,
observing that it knew of "no case .. . in which the 'held for sale'
language of the FDCA ha[d] been applied to an individual who gave
away a homespun drug or product in a wholly noncommercial
setting."52
While Geborde's facts involved criminally dangerous activity
prohibited under state law,5 3 the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
FDCA's "held for sale" provision applies to the distribution of any
unapproved drug. The decision thus highlights a key statutory
limitation on the FDA's regulatory power. This statutory limit will
become increasingly important as patient advocacy groups gain the
technological tools to create and share homespun individualized
therapies.54
III. PRODUCT/SERVICE DISTINCTION
A. Practice of Medicine
Congress made it clear when it enacted the FDCA that it did
not intend for federal regulation to interfere with the practice of
medicine.55 While subsequent amendments to the Act have expanded
the agency's regulatory jurisdiction, this fundamental restriction on
federal regulatory power remains intact. The agency does have
statutory authority to restrict distribution of a medical device if "the
Secretary determines that there cannot otherwise be reasonable
assurance of its safety and effectiveness."5 6 Additionally, amendments
to the FDCA enacted in 2007 gave the FDA express authority to
50. See id. at 928 (explaining that Geborde made a batch of GHB by mixing, in a bucket,
sodium hydroxide and a common industrial solvent).
51. Id. at 932.
52. Id. at 931-32.
53. Id. at 927 (noting that Geborde was convicted of manslaughter in state court and
sentenced to prison).
54. See infra pp. 311-14.
55. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 (proposed Aug. 15, 1972)
(rule not adopted) ("Congress ... declined to provide any legislative restrictions upon the medical
profession.").
56. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(e)(1) (2012).
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restrict distribution of licensed drugs.57 However, the agency directly
imposes these controls on product sponsors, not medical
practitioners.5 8 Since the statute's enactment in 1938, the FDA has
consistently conceded that it cannot prevent physicians from
prescribing approved products for unapproved, off-label uses.5 9 Once a
medical product has been approved or cleared by the FDA and
lawfully shipped in interstate commerce, its use in the practice of
medicine is regulated by the states pursuant to their plenary police
powers.60 Hence, the FDA's regulatory jurisdiction extends to the
manufacture, promotion, and dissemination of medical products
themselves, but not to practitioners' delivery of health care services
that utilize those products.6 1
57. Under section 505-1 of the FDCA, added by the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, a new drug applicant must submit, as part of its application, a
proposed risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) if the FDA determines that a REMS is
necessary to ensure that the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks. The Act lists several possible
elements of a REMS, which may require a drug sponsor to create a communication guide for
patients; educate and train health care providers on proper use of the drug; implement a patient
monitoring system; establish a scheme for certifying pharmacies to dispense the drug; or ensure
that the drug is administered only in certain settings, such as hospitals. See 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a),
(e), (f) (2012).
58. See 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A) (2012) (providing that any "responsible person" who
violates § 355-1 shall be subject to civil monetary penalties); § 355-1(b)(7) ("The term 'responsible
person' means the person submitting a covered application or the holder of the approved such
application.").
59. Legal Status of Approved Labeling for Prescription Drugs; Prescribing for Uses
Unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration, 37 Fed. Reg. 16503 ("Once a new drug is in a
local pharmacy after interstate shipment, the physician may, as part of the practice of medicine,
lawfully prescribe a different dosage for his patient, or may otherwise vary the conditions of use
from those approved in the package insert, without informing or obtaining the approval of the
Food and Drug Administration."); see also 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2012) ("Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to prescribe or
administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition or disease within a
legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.").
60. Lars Noah, Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of
Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 149, 159 ("The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the police
powers of the states justified their regulation of the practice of medicine.").
61. The lone exception to the general rule that the FDA does not regulate off-label
prescribing is the federal prohibition against knowingly prescribing, dispensing, or
administering human growth hormone (HGH) for anything other than FDA-approved uses. 21
U.S.C. § 333(e) (2012). Congress made this amendment to the FDCA via the Anabolic Steroids
Control Act, enacted as Title XIX of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1904,
104 Stat. 4851, 4853 (1990). Congress passed this statute to prevent the use of HGH to enhance
athletic performance, and reiterated when it passed separate legislation in 1997: "In general, the
FDA has no authority to regulate how physicians prescribe approved drugs in the context of their
medical practice." H.R. REP. NO. 105-310, at 60 (1997).
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
1. Off-Label Prescribing
The Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. EverS62 sharply
illuminates this essential product/service distinction. Dr. H. Ray
Evers owned and operated the Ra-Mar clinic, an inpatient facility that
specialized in the use of "chemo-endartectomy therapy" for the
treatment of circulatory disorders caused by atherosclerosis.63 The
cornerstone of Evers's therapy was the use of chelating drugs,
compounds that bond with heavy metals and cause them to be
excreted through the kidneys.64 The FDA had approved chelating
drugs for the treatment of lead and other heavy metal poisoning, but it
had not approved any chelating drug for the treatment of circulatory
disorders.65  Seeking to enjoin Evers's vigorous promotion and
advertising of his off-label use of these drugs, the agency charged him
with violating section 301(k) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 331(k).66 This
provision prohibits any act with respect to a drug that "is done while
such [drug] is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after
shipment in interstate commerce and [which] results in such article
being .. . misbranded."67 Specifically, the government alleged that Dr.
Evers misbranded the chelating agent Calcium EDTA under section
502(f)(1) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1), by failing to provide
"adequate directions for use" of Calcium EDTA in the treatment of
circulatory disorders.68
The government stipulated that the FDCA's misbranding
provisions do not prohibit a licensed physician from prescribing a
licensed drug for any purpose, whether or not that purpose has been
FDA approved.69 In fact, the FDA had expressly informed Dr. Evers
that he was permitted to prescribe Calcium EDTA for the treatment of
circulatory disorders.70 The basis for the government's prosecution
was Dr. Evers's aggressive promotion and advertising of his off-label
use of chelating drugs.71  The government asserted that Evers's
promotional efforts took his actions outside the bounds of the routine
62. United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981).
63. Id. at 1044-45 (noting that the lay term for atherosclerosis is "hardening of the
arteries").
64. Id. at 1045.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1045-47.
67. Id. at 1045.
68. Id. at 1047-48 (explaining that § 502(f)(1) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1), deems
a drug to be misbranded "unless its labeling bears ... adequate directions for use").





practice of medicine and into the scope of FDA regulation.72 The Fifth
Circuit, however, scrutinized sections 301(k) and 502(f)(1) of the
FDCA and concluded that the provisions did not apply to Dr. Evers.73
Although the court held the chelating drugs were for sale within the
meaning of section 301(k) when Dr. Evers administered them to his
patients,74 Dr. Evers's actions did not cause the drugs to be
misbranded under section 502(f)(1). 75
The court grounded its decision in a careful reading of the
FDCA's labeling provisions and the context of the overall federal
regulatory scheme. Since Calcium EDTA was a prescription drug, it
was not possible for Dr. Evers to provide "adequate directions for [lay]
use."76 Thus, if the labeling requirements applied to Dr. Evers, the
only way for him to avoid a misbranding charge would have been to
meet the criteria for a statutory or regulatory exemption from section
502(f)(1). A statutory exemption from the "adequate directions for
use" requirement applies at the time that a prescription drug is
prescribed and dispensed if certain basic information is provided on
the label.7 7 Additionally, a broader regulatory exemption applies if a
prescription drug's label includes "adequate information for its
use . . . under which practitioners licensed by law to administer the
drug can use the drug safely and for the purposes for which it is
intended."78 The court reasoned that the purpose of this scheme is to
ensure that essential information about a drug's safety and efficacy
reaches the person who will ultimately decide whether and how to
administer it.79 In the case of over-the-counter drugs, the decision
maker is a lay user and, therefore, the drug's label must include
adequate directions for lay use.80 In the case of prescription drugs, on
the other hand, a physician makes the ultimate judgment and,
therefore, the drug is not misbranded so long as its label contains
adequate information for licensed practitioners.8 1
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1049-53.
74. Id. at 1050.
75. Id. at 1053.
76. Id. at 1050-51 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (1980), which interprets "adequate
directions for use" to mean "directions under which the layman can use a drug safely and for the
purposes for which it is intended").
77. 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (2012) (listing the information that must be contained on a
prescription drug's label in order to qualify for this exemption, including "directions for use and
cautionary statements, if any, contained in such prescription").
78. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(1) (2016) (emphasis added).
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Herein lies the fatal flaw in the government's case. The FDA
argued that Dr. Evers violated section 301(k) of the FDCA by holding
his chelating drugs for sale to patients without providing adequate
directions for use by prescribing physicians.82 Yet, the government
conceded that Dr. Evers was the only physician who used the allegedly
misbranded Calcium EDTA. 83 Its argument thus turned on the
"nonsensical" proposition that Dr. Evers did not provide adequate
directions to himself.84 The court reasoned: "Section 301(k) cannot
reasonably be read to require a physician who is holding a drug for
sale only to patients to provide adequate information to physicians to
whom he is not distributing the drug."85 Since Dr. Evers did not
distribute Calcium EDTA to other licensed physicians, the court
concluded that he did not violate the FDCA's misbranding
provisions.86 Notably, the court expressly declined to assess the safety
and efficacy of Dr. Evers's practices,87 the reasonableness of which
undoubtedly was governed by state law.
2. Controlled Substances
The FDCA's statutory constraints are evident when compared
to the federal government's more expansive regulatory jurisdiction
under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Enacted in 1970, the
CSA criminalizes the unauthorized manufacture, distribution,
dispensing, and possession of substances classified in any of the CSA's
five schedules.88 Substances are placed in one of the five schedules
based on their potential for abuse or dependence, their accepted
medical use, and their accepted safety when used under medical
supervision.89 Congress scheduled several drugs when it passed the
CSA and authorized the US Attorney General to add, remove, or
reschedule substances based on scientific and medical findings by the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.90  A 1971 regulation
implementing the CSA requires that every prescription for a
controlled substance "be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an




86. Id. at 1053-54.
87. Id. at 1053 ("We have not been called upon in this case to consider the safety and
effectiveness of Dr. Evers'[s] use of chelation therapy; accordingly, we neither approve nor
criticize his medical practices.").
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,
12-13 (2005).
89. Raich, 545 U.S. at 13-14.
90. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 250 (2006).
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individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional
practice."91 Physicians must be registered with the Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) to issue lawful prescriptions for controlled drugs, and
the Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke a physician's
registration if the prescriber's registration would be "inconsistent with
the public interest."92
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court upheld the federal
government's enforcement of the CSA against individuals who used
marijuana for personal, physician-recommended medical purposes.93
Citing Wickard v. Filburn, the Court ruled that Congress's Commerce
Clause authority includes the power to prohibit the intrastate,
noncommercial cultivation and possession of cannabis as
recommended by a patient's physician in compliance with state law.9 4
Importantly, once the Court resolved the contested constitutional
question, it indisputably followed that the federal government had
statutory authority to outlaw medical marijuana use.95 The CSA gives
the DEA authority to ban the manufacture and use of cannabis,
supplanting contrary state law, because marijuana has no federally
recognized legitimate medical purpose and is consequently classified
as a Schedule I drug.96 This scheduling designation also leaves no role
for the FDA, other than to oversee marijuana's interstate shipment for
91. 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a) (2016) (emphasis added). The regulatory language mimics the
statutory language of the CSA, which defines a "valid prescription" as one "issued for a
legitimate medical purpose." 21 U.S.C. § 830(b)(3)(A)(ii) (2012).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 822(a)(2) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) (2012). When deciding whether a
practitioner's registration is in the public interest, the Attorney General shall consider:
"(1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority.
"(2) The applicant's experience in dispensing, or conducting research with respect to
controlled substances.
"(3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances.
"(4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances.
"(5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and safety."
21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (2012).
93. Raich, 545 U.S. at 5-9.
94. Id. at 18-19 ("Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely
intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes
that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate
market in that commodity."); id. at 29 ("The Supremacy Clause unambiguously provides that if
there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall prevail.").
95. Id. at 32-33.
96. Id. at 14.
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investigational use in clinical trials designed to test marijuana's
therapeutic effects.97
Gonzales v. Oregon,98 decided only seven months after Gonzales
v. Raich, highlights the significance of a Schedule I classification for
the federal drug regulatory scheme. Gonzales v. Oregon considered
whether the federal government has authority under the CSA to
prohibit doctors from prescribing lethal drugs for use in physician-
assisted suicide, notwithstanding state law permitting the practice.99
Specifically, the US Attorney General sought to revoke the DEA
registration of physicians who issued prescriptions in compliance with
the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, on the ground that dispensing or
prescribing controlled substances for this use violates the CSA
because physician-assisted suicide is not a legitimate medical
purpose.100 The Supreme Court ruled that the Attorney General had
exceeded the bounds of his statutory authority, as he lacked the power
to declare unlawful clinical procedures specifically authorized under
state law.10 1 The Court explained that the CSA did not give the
Attorney General unbridled discretion to define the legitimate practice
of medicine.102  Rather, Congress's delegation of authority to the
federal executive branch was limited to scheduling controlled
substances and setting medical standards of care for the treatment of
narcotic addiction.103
The key factual distinction driving the divergent outcomes in
Gonzales v. Raich and Gonzales v. Oregon is the different scheduling
of the relevant controlled substances in each case. Marijuana, the
substance at issue in Raich, has no legitimate medical use under
97. Id. ("By classifying marijuana as a Schedule 1 drug, as opposed to listing it on a
lesser schedule, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of marijuana became a criminal
offense, with the sole exception being use of the drug as part of a Food and Drug Administration
preapproved research study.").
98. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 241 (2006).
99. Id. at 248-49.
100. Id. at 253-54 (explaining that the Attorney General issued an Interpretive Rule
announcing his view that prescribing controlled substances for the purpose of physician-assisted
suicide violates the CSA, regardless of whether state law authorizes the practice).
101. Id. at 258-63 ("It would be anomalous for Congress to have so painstakingly
described the Attorney General's limited authority to deregister a single physician or schedule a
single drug, but to have given him, just by implication, authority to declare an entire class of
activity outside 'the course of professional practice,' and therefore a criminal violation of the
CSA.").
102. Id. at 263.
103. Id. at 265-69 (explaining that the Attorney General shares decision-making power
with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, whose authority to make
medical judgments is limited to the narrow statutory objectives of scheduling controlled
substances and determining appropriate methods of treatment for narcotic addiction).
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federal law and is therefore listed as a Schedule I drug.104 Hence, the
federal government has constitutional power under the Commerce
Clause and statutory power under the CSA to prohibit its possession
and use, regardless of conflicting state law. In contrast, the drugs at
issue in Gonzales v. Oregon are classified as Schedule II drugs and are
FDA approved for therapeutic uses other than physician-assisted
suicide.105  The CSA prohibits physicians from trafficking these
controlled substances under the guise of providing medical
treatment.106  Otherwise, the states retain exclusive authority to
determine whether a physician's off-label use of an FDA-approved,
non-Schedule I drug is for a legitimate medical purpose. The Supreme
Court explained that this resolution is both consistent with the
statutory language of the CSA and accords with federalism principles:
The statute and our case law amply support the conclusion that Congress regulates
medical practice insofar as it bars doctors from using their prescription-writing powers
as a means to engage in illicit drug dealing and trafficking as conventionally
understood. Beyond this, however, the statute manifests no intent to regulate the
practice of medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the structure and
limitations of federalism, which allows the States 'great latitude under their police
powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of
all persons."'
107
B. Practice of Pharmacy
1. 1997 FDAMA Safe Harbor
As with the practice of medicine, statutory constraints limit the
FDA's authority to regulate the practice of pharmacy. Drug
compounding is the process by which a pharmacist combines or alters
drug ingredients pursuant to a physician's prescription to create a
medication that meets the unique needs of an individual patient.108
Compounding is typically used to develop a therapy that is not
commercially available, such as a drug for a patient who is allergic to
an ingredient in a mass-produced product or who requires a different
dosage or route of administration.109 It is a traditional aspect of the
practice of pharmacy and is regulated by the states through their
104. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 14 (2005).
105. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. at 249-50.
106. Id. at 250-51.
107. Id. at 269-70 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (quoting
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985))).
108. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360-61 (2002) (defining
compounding); United States v. Franck's Lab, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
("The pharmacist-physician-patient relationship forms the basis of what is commonly known as
'traditional pharmacy compounding."').
109. W States, 535 U.S. at 361.
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licensing authorities.110  The FDCA, as amended, permits
compounding pharmacies to avoid the new drug approval process
under certain statutorily defined circumstances.111  Pharmacy
compounding thus straddles a boundary between product
manufacturing within the scope of the FDA's jurisdiction and service
delivery outside the FDA's regulatory domain.
In the early 1990s, the FDA became concerned that some
pharmacies were taking advantage of the agency's historically lenient
stance toward compounding.112 The agency asserted that pharmacies
were endangering public health by engaging in large-scale drug
production while evading the FDCA's new drug approval,
adulteration, and misbranding provisions.113  To prevent
circumvention of FDA regulation, in 1992, the agency promulgated a
Compliance Policy Guide (CPG) declaring that it had expansive
regulatory authority over all compounding activities and would
initiate enforcement actions against pharmacies that performed
practices "normally associated with a manufacturer."1 14  The 1992
CPG listed nine non-exhaustive factors the FDA would consider in
exercising its enforcement discretion.115  These factors included
whether a pharmacy advertised specific compounded drug products,
regularly produced essentially generic copies of commercially available
products, used commercial scale equipment, compounded large
amounts of drugs in anticipation of receiving prescriptions, offered
compounded drugs at wholesale to other entities, or distributed
inordinate amounts of compounded products out of state.1 1 6
Congress partially codified the FDA's 1992 compounding policy
when it enacted the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997
(FDAMA). 117  The FDAMA added section 503A to the FDCA,
establishing a statutory safe harbor from the Act's new drug approval
110. See id. (noting that some states require all licensed pharmacies to offer
compounding services).
111. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
new human drugs that result from compounding are exempt from the adulteration, misbranding,
and new drug approval provisions of 21 U.S.C. §§ 351(a)(2)(B), 352(f)(1), and 355 if they comply
with the conditions in § 353a).
112. Id. at 389.
113. Id. at 389-90.
114. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Compliance Policy Guide No. 460.200, Pharmacy
Compounding, at 1, 3 (reissued May 29, 2002) (originally issued as Compliance Policy Guide No.
7132.16, Manufacture, Distribution, and Promotion of Adulterated, Misbranded, or Unapproved
New Drugs for Human Use by State-Licensed Pharmacies (Mar. 16, 1992) (rescinded by 64 Fed.
Reg. 1207-01 (Jan. 8, 1999))).
115. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 76a-77a, W. States, 535 U.S. 357 (No. 01-
344).
116. See W. States, 535 U.S. at 363.
117. Id. at 364.
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and other requirements.1 1 8  Like the 1992 CPG, section 503A
conditioned the exemption on compliance with several restrictions on
compounding pharmacies' practices and advertising.119  Congress
thereby aimed to limit the safe harbor to traditional compounding as
opposed to disguised manufacturing. 120
In 2002, the Supreme Court in Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center invalidated the advertising-related provisions of
section 503A as unconstitutional restrictions on commercial speech.121
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the advertising
provisions violated the First Amendment but declined to address
whether the stricken provisions were severable from section 503A's
non-speech-related provisions.122  Western States thus created
uncertainty as to whether the FDAMA statutory safe harbor for
traditional compounding had been invalidated in its entirety. 123
The FDA issued a revised CPG in response to the Western
States decision in which it took the position that all of section 503A
had been invalidated.124 The agency asserted that compounded drugs
were not exempt from the FDA's new drug, adulteration, and
misbranding provisions, but assured pharmacists that it would
continue to exercise enforcement discretion with respect to traditional
compounding activities.125 The 2002 CPG on compounding human
drugs again listed factors that the FDA would use in determining
whether to bring enforcement actions.126 These factors were similar,
but not identical, to those listed in the 1992 CPG.127 The agency
eliminated the factors relating to advertising and out-of-state
distribution, and it added two new factors that would support
enforcement action: compounding drugs that were withdrawn from the
118. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, tit. I, § 127, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2012)).
119. See id.; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 76a-77a, W. States, 535 U.S. 357 (No. 01-
344).
120. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 390-91 (5th Cir. 2008).
121. W States, 535 U.S. at 360.
122. Id. (noting that the parties had not appealed the Ninth Circuit's holding that § 503A
was invalid in its entirety because the FDAMA was non-severable).
123. See id.
124. See Compliance Policy Guide No. 460.200, Pharmacy Compounding, supra note 114,
at 2.
125. See id. at 3.
126. See id. at 3-4.
127. See id.; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 76a-77a, Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (No. 01-344).
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market for safety reasons and compounding drugs from bulk
ingredients that are not components of FDA-approved drugs.128
The FDA's reassertion of its authority over pharmacy
compounding sparked new legal challenges.129 In 2006, a federal
district court held that the invalidated advertising provisions of
section 503A were severable from the remainder of the statute and
that the rest of section 503A remained in full effect.130 The court
further found that the statutory safe harbor demonstrated "that
Congress intended to declare that compounding is an approved and
legal practice."131 It interpreted section. 503A to create a blanket
"implicit exemption" from the FDCA's new drug approval process for
pharmacy compounders.132 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit split with the
Ninth Circuit and affirmed the district court's holding that the
unconstitutional advertising restrictions were severable from the rest
of section 503A.133 However, the Fifth Circuit overturned the district
court's determination that compounding pharmacies were wholly
exempt from the FDCA's new drug requirements.134 Rather, the court
interpreted the FDCA to create a narrow, conditional exemption only
for drug compounders who complied with section 503A's extant
requirements. 135
The FDA triggered an additional challenge to its statutory
authority in 2010 when it sought to enjoin Franck's Lab, a Florida
compounding facility, from distributing veterinarian-prescribed
compounded animal drugs.136 The agency's action was prompted by a
2009 incident in which twenty-one polo horses died after receiving an
overly potent medication that Franck's Lab had incorrectly
128. Compliance Policy Guide No. 460.200, Pharmacy Compounding, supra note 114, at
3-4. The FDA also issued a CPG on compounding animal drugs. U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
Compliance Policy Guide No. 608.400, Compounding of Drugs for Use in Animals (July 14, 2003).
The thirteen factors applicable to animal drugs were similar, but not identical, to those
applicable to human drugs. See id. at 4-5; Compliance Policy Guide No. 460.200, Pharmacy
Compounding, supra note 114, at 3-4.
129. See Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Gonzales, 451 F. Supp. 2d 854 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
130. See id. at 862-63.
131. Id. at 863.
132. Id. ("Because pharmacies are permitted to compound, this Court finds that any
drugs created by the compounding process are therefore implicitly exempt from the new drug
approval process.").
133. Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383, 401 (5th Cir. 2008).
134. Id. at 395, 405-06 ("The 'new drug' definition contains no general exception for
drugs created by compounding.").
135. Id. at 405 ("[Cjompounded drugs are in fact 'new drugs' as defined by [21 U.S.C.] §
321(p) but are exempt from the requirements of §§ 351(a)(2)(B), 352(f)(1), and 355 if and only if
they comply with the conditions set forth in § 353a.").
136. United States v. Franck's Lab, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1211, 1241 (M.D. Fla.
2011) (describing this action as unprecedented).
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compounded due to a mathematical error.137 Although the Florida
Board of Pharmacy thoroughly investigated the matter and decided to
allow Franck's to continue its compounding practice without
restriction, the FDA charged Franck's with violating the FDCA by
compounding animal drugs from bulk substances.138 In response,
Franck's submitted numerous declarations from veterinarians,
pharmacists, and other experts asserting that, inter alia,
compounding from bulk was a ubiquitous, life-saving technique and
was "widely preferred" over compounding from finished products.139
Franck's further noted that Florida, like many other states, expressly
recognized compounding from bulk substances as a well accepted part
of the practice of pharmacy.140
Citing the Fifth Circuit's decision in Medical Center Pharmacy
v. Mukasey, the district court agreed that the FDCA's "new drug"
definition contains no general exception for compounding
pharmacies.141 But the court observed that the FDA's "maximalist"
interpretation of the FDCA was a marked departure from its prior
position on drug compounding.142  The agency had previously
acknowledged the utility of bulk compounding and had delineated
circumstances in which it would not subject pharmacists to regulatory
action for compounding drugs from bulk for non food-producing
animals.143 Moreover, the FDA's 2002 CPG strongly suggested that it
would allow bulk compounding of human drugs so long as the bulk
137. Id. at 1213.
138. Id. at 1213-14 ("FDA has taken the bright-line position that any compounding of
animal medications from bulk substances violates its enabling statute, the [FDCA], even when
conducted by a state-licensed pharmacist for an individual animal patient pursuant to a valid
veterinary prescription."); see 21 C.F.R. § 207.3(a)(4) (2016) (defining "bulk drug substance" as
"any substance that is represented for use in a drug and that, when used in the manufacturing,
processing, or packaging of a drug, becomes an active ingredient or a finished dosage form of the
drug").
139. Franck's Lab, 816 F. Supp. 2d at 1215, 1217-18 ("Pharmacists also favor
compounding from bulk because use of bulk ingredients ensures that the compounded medicine
is of the expected purity, potency, and quality; further, it is often not practical or possible to
compound a medically necessary drug product from an FDA-approved finished drug product.").
140. Id. at 1218-19.
141. Id. at 1236 ("As the Fifth Circuit noted in Medical Center, . . . '[b]elying the
Pharmacies' argument that compounded drugs are not "new drugs" by virtue of their creation by
licensed pharmacists, the definition of "new drug" focuses on the drug's composition and use
rather than on the process by which it was created."').
142. Id. at 1239 ("[T]he Fifth Circuit's faith that the FDA would not seek to enforce a
'maximalist' interpretation of its authority turned out to be misplaced.").
143. Id. at 1227-28 (noting that the FDA adopted a "decidedly more hostile tone" toward
compounding in its 2003 CPG on animal drug compounding than it did in its 2002 human drug
counterpart and in its earlier 1996 CPG on animal drug compounding).
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substances were components of FDA-approved drugs.144 The district
court concluded that the agency's new hostile stance contravened the
policy objectives of the FDCA: "Because Congress appeared to be
focused on the fact that manufacturing-unlike the practice of
pharmacy-was conducted by unlicensed, unregulated
nonprofessionals, it seems unlikely that it would have intended to
subject professionally dispensed drugs to the same regulatory
scheme."145 The court, therefore, held that the FDA lacked statutory
authority to enjoin a pharmacy from practicing traditional
compounding to meet the unique needs of individual patients in
compliance with state law.146
The government appealed the district court's decision to the
Eleventh Circuit.147  But before the appellate court heard oral
arguments, the parties jointly filed a motion to vacate and dismiss the
decision as moot, citing the sale of Franck's Lab and the company's
decision to permanently discontinue its compounding operations.148
The Eleventh Circuit granted the motion in 2012, leaving unresolved
questions about the scope of the FDA's statutory authority to regulate
compounding pharmacies.149
2. Compounding Quality Act of 2013
At the same time that the Franck's Lab litigation was winding
down, a deadly fungal meningitis outbreak linked to a large-scale
compounding facility placed a national spotlight on the FDA's hazy
regulatory authority over drug compounding.150 In response, Congress
enacted the Compounding Quality Act as part of the Drug Quality and
144. Id. at 1227 (noting that the 2002 CPG listed a compounder's use of bulk ingredients
that were not components of FDA approved drugs as a factor that the FDA would consider in
deciding whether to bring an enforcement action).
145. Id. at 1245-46.
146. Id. at 1250.
147. See United States v. Franck's Lab, Inc., No. 11-15350, 2012 WL 10234948, *1 (11th
Cir. 2012).
148. See Joint Motion to Vacate and Dismiss as Moot at 3-4, Franck's Lab, 2012 WL
10234948.
149. Id.
150. See Kurt Eichenwald, Killer Pharmacy: Inside a Medical Mass Murder Case,
NEWSWEEK (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/2015/04/24/inside-one-most-murderous-
corporate-crimes-us-history-322665.html [https://perma.cc/292T-T9J4] (reporting that, in 2012,
eight hundred patients were infected by a contaminated injectable steroid solution manufactured
and shipped throughout the country by a Massachusetts compounding facility, leading to sixty-
four deaths and numerous federal indictments against individuals who worked for or were
connected to the facility, including charges of murder, racketeering, and fraud).
306 [Vol. XIX:2:285
2016] CUSTOMIZED MEDICINE 307
Security Act of 2013.151 The Compounding Quality Act amended
section 503A of the FDCA to remove the restrictions on the promotion
of specific compounded products and the solicitation of prescriptions
for compounded drugs.152 Traditional pharmacy compounders that
meet section 503A's revised criteria are exempt from the FDCA's
current Good Manufacturing Practices (cGMP), labeling, and new
drug approval requirements.15 3 The Act also added a new section
503B that created a new category of compounding pharmacy known as
an "outsourcing facility." 154 Registered outsourcing facilities that meet
section 503B's criteria are exempt from the new drug approval process
but still must comply with cGMPs and certain other FDCA
requirements. 155
' After the passage of the Compounding Quality Act, the FDA
withdrew its 2002 CPG and issued policy statements on
implementation of the new law.156  In October 2015, the FDA
published a new guidance on traditional pharmacy compounding of
human drugs under amended section 503A.15 7 The agency stressed
that the section 503A exemption applies only to products that are
compounded for an identified individual patient in the context of an
established relationship between the patient and healthcare
professionals licensed under state law to prescribe and compound
151. Drug Quality and Security Act, Pub. L. No. 113-54, §§ 101-107, 127 Stat. 587, 587-
98 (2013) (amendments codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2012)); 159 Cong. Rec. H5946-02 (daily ed.
Sept. 28, 2013) (statement of Mr. Upton).
152. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Pharmacy Compounding of Human Drug Products Under
Section 503A of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, at 2 (June 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/GuidancesUC
M469119 [https://perma.cclL24C-PP47].
153. Id. Traditional compounders that fall within the section 503A exemption remain
subject to other FDCA requirements, including prohibitions against unsanitary manufacturing
conditions; misrepresentations about the quality, strength, or purity of compounded drugs; and
false or misleading labeling, advertising, or promotion. Id. at 6-7.
154. Id. at 1 n.2. Section 503B(d)(4) of the FDCA defines an "outsourcing facility" as "a
facility at one geographic location or address that-(i) is engaged in the compounding of sterile
drugs; (ii) has elected to register as an outsourcing facility; and (iii) complies with all of the
requirements of this section." Drug Quality and Security Act § 102 (amendments codified at 21
U.S.C. § 353b). Requirements under section 503B include, inter alia, compliance with restrictions
on the use of bulk drug substances, compliance with US Pharmacopeia standards, a prohibition
against compounding drugs that are essentially copies of approved drugs, a requirement to
prominently label products as compounded drugs, and compliance with registration and
reporting requirements.
155. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance for Entities Considering Whether to Register
as Outsourcing Facilities Under Section 503B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, at 2-
4 (Aug. 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-gen/documents
/document/ucm434171.pdf [https://perma.cc/VY7B-KHX8].
156. Pharmacy Compounding of Human Drug Products Under Section 503A of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 152, at 2.
157. Id.
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
drugs.15 8 The guidance permits bulk compounding if the drug product
is compounded in compliance with a US Pharmacopoeia or National
Formulary monograph or the bulk ingredients are either components
of an FDA-approved drug or on a list of acceptable bulk substances
designated by the FDA through regulation.159 The FDA further
requires traditional compounding pharmacies either to operate in a
state that has entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
with the FDA to investigate inordinate interstate distribution of
compounded products or to cap interstate distribution at no more than
5 percent of the pharmacy's total prescription orders.160
In August 2015, the FDA issued guidances for entities
considering whether to register with the FDA as outsourcing facilities
under section 503B.161 The agency clarified that section 503B only
applies to facilities that compound sterile human drugs.162 It does not
cover the manufacture of biological products subject to licensure under
the PHSA.163 The guidance noted that an outsourcing facility differs
from a traditional compounding pharmacy in that it need not be
licensed by the state.164 An outsourcing facility also may compound
and distribute drugs to healthcare providers without first obtaining
prescriptions for individual patients.165 Outsourcing facilities must
satisfy several conditions in order to qualify for exemptions from the
new drug approval process and from the FDCA's "adequate directions
for use" labeling requirement and track and trace requirements.1 6 6
These conditions include registering with the FDA, submitting reports
to the agency, complying with restrictions on bulk compounding, not
producing copies of commercially available products, not compounding
drugs that the FDA designates as presenting "demonstrable
difficulties" for compounding, and not acting as a wholesale supplier of
compounded drugs.167
158. Id. at 3.
159. Id. at 3-4.
160. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 6 ("FDA does not intend to enforce the 5 [percent] limit on
interstate distribution until after FDA has finalized an MOU and made it available to the states
for their consideration and signature.").
161. Guidance for Entities Considering Whether to Register as Outsourcing Facilities
Under Section 503B of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 155.
162. Id. at 4.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id. at 2 n.4.
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id. at 2-3.
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IV. EMERGING TRENDS INCREASINGLY STRAIN THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL
POWER
A. New Technologies
1. Autologous Stem Cell Therapy
Until the 1980s, the procurement of cadaver tissue for surgical
use was considered an aspect of the practice of medicine outside the
scope of FDA regulation.168  However, as technological advances
expanded the range of human-source materials that could be used as
alternatives to man-made replacement parts, hospitals began to
out-source procurement operations to independent tissue banks.169 In
1993, the FDA published an interim rule mandating screening of
tissue donors, testing of donated tissues, and the maintenance of
records for inspection by FDA regulators.170 These requirements did
not apply to tissues that were already regulated as drugs, devices, or
biological products or to whole organs and bone marrow (which are
overseen by other administrative agencies).171
This initial assertion of control over tissue banks culminated in
the creation of a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for
suppliers of human cellular and tissue-based products. The FDA
published a final rule on Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products (HCT/Ps) in 2001.172 The crux of the rule was
the delineation of criteria for determining when a cellular or tissue-
based product would be classified as a new drug or Class III medical
device.173 The FDA cited two main factors: (1) whether the donated
tissue is expected to perform the same function in the recipient that it
performed in the donor ("homologous use")174 and (2) whether the
168. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 1168.
169. Id.
170. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Compliance Program Guidance Manual No. 7341.002,




171. Richard Merrill, Human Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New Technologies
Challenge FDA, 3 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 36 (2002).
172. 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19, 2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1271 (2016)). These
regulations define HCT/Ps as "articles containing or consisting of human cells or tissues that are
intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion, or transfer into a human recipient." 21
C.F.R. § 1271.3(d).
173. Merrill, supra note 171, at 48.
174. Id. The agency defines "homologous use" as "the replacement . . . or
supplementation of a recipient's cells or tissues with a HCT/P that performs the same basic
function or functions in the recipient as in the donor." 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(c).
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tissue has been more than "minimally manipulated."1 7 5 The HCT/P
rule thus categorically distinguished between products regulated
solely under section 361 of the PHSA and products regulated more
extensively under either or both the drug and device provisions the
FDCA and section 351 of the PHSA, in addition to section 361 of the
PHSA. 176 The FDA also entirely exempted certain medical procedures
from the federal regulatory scheme.177  "You are not required to
comply with the requirements of [Part 1271 promulgated under
section 361 of the PHSA] if you are an establishment that removes
HCT/P's [sic] from an individual and implants such HCT/P's [sic] into
the same individual during the same surgical procedure"178 or "if you
are an establishment that only recovers reproductive cells or tissue
and immediately transfers them into a sexually intimate partner of
the cell or tissue donor."179
In 2004, the FDA issued current Good Tissue Practice (cGTP)
regulations pursuant to its authority under section 361 of the
PHSA.180 The agency clarified that HCT/Ps categorized as drugs,
devices, or biological products must be manufactured in accordance
with cGTP regulations, in addition to applicable Current Good
Manufacturing Practice (cGMP) and quality system regulations.181
The FDA treats umbilical cord blood as transplantable tissue subject
to its general human tissue regulations rather than as whole blood
subject to the requirements for donated blood and blood products.182
The agency regulates autologous administration-the return of cord
blood to its original donor-solely under section 361 of the PHSA. 183
However, the FDA has cautioned that more rigorous regulation may
175. The agency defines "minimal manipulation" of structural tissue as "processing that
does not alter the original relevant characteristics of the tissue relating to the tissue's utility for
reconstruction, repair, or replacement." 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f)(1). It defines "minimal
manipulation" with respect to cells and nonstructural tissues as "processing that does not alter
the relevant biological characteristics of cells or tissues." 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(f)(2).
176. Merrill, supra note 171, at 48.
177. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.15.
178. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.15(b) (emphasis added).
179. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.15(e).
180. Current Good Tissue Practice for Human Cell, Tissue, and Cellular and Tissue-
Based Product Establishments; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 68612 (Nov. 24, 2004).
181. cGMPs for drugs are codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210 & 211. cGMPs for devices are
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 820. In the 1990s, the FDA substantially revised 21 C.F.R. pt. 820 and
renamed it the "Quality System" regulation to reflect the expansion of the device cGMPs to cover
a comprehensive system of quality control. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 1261-
63.
182. David A. Suski, Frozen Blood, Neonates, and FDA: The Regulation of Placental
Umbilical Cord Blood, 84 VA. L. REV. 715, 716 (1998).
183. 21 C.F.R. § 1271.10(a).
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be required if cord blood is significantly manipulated to enhance its
therapeutic properties.184
Stem cells are a widely touted class of HCT/Ps that have
particularly captured the FDA's attention. Stem cell therapies may be
created using either embryonic stem cells or adult stem cells.185 By
the somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT) technique, scientists create
embryonic stem cells from a recipient's own cells and turn the stem
cells into various tissues for transplantation, thereby avoiding
immunological rejection of genetically non-identical tissue.186
Alternatively, adult stem cells may be harvested from patients,
cultured in a laboratory, and then returned to patients for repair or
replacement of damaged and diseased tissue.187 Embryonic stem cell
therapy is referred to as therapeutic cloning, as it involves the
creation of an embryo that is a genetic copy of the intended recipient
of the transplanted tissue." Since the production of adult stem cells
does not require the creation of an embryo and thereby evades
attendant moral controversy, autologous189 adult stem cell therapies
hold great clinical and commercial promise.
A recent dispute between the FDA and a pair of Colorado
physicians who promoted and administered adult stem cell therapy
highlights the limits of the agency's power to regulate this emerging
technology. Dr. Christopher Centon and Dr. John Schultz developed
the RegenexxTM Procedure, a cellular therapy for orthopedic patients
that involves harvesting stem cells from a patient's bone marrow or
synovial fluid, culturing those cells for several weeks in a laboratory
with growth factors from the patient's blood, placing the cultured cells
184. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 1173-74.
185. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What Are Stem Cells? How Are They Regulated? (Oct. 21,
2016), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucml94655.htm [https://perma.ce
/CYY9-BGN4].
186. See HHMI, Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer Animation, BIOlNTERACTIVE (Oct. 31,
2016), http://www.hhmi.org/biointeractive/somatic-cell-nuclear-transfer-animation [https://perma
.cc/42KY-UKK3].
187. See Adult Stem Cells 101, BOS. CHILD. HOSP., (Oct. 31, 2016),
http://stemcell.childrenshospital.org/about-stem-cells/adult-somatic-stem-cells-101/
[https://perma.cc/37R8-ADK5].
188. See What Are Stem Cells? How Are They Regulated?, supra note 185. Therapeutic
cloning differs from reproductive cloning in that the cloned embryo is used to produce cellular
therapies rather than being implanted into a uterus to produce a human being. DAVID
ORENTLICHER, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI, & MARK A. HALL, BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 557
(2d ed. 2008). In 1998, the FDA asserted regulatory authority over reproductive cloning and
prohibited clinical research to create a somatic cell clone intended to produce a cloned human
being without an effective investigational new drug application (IND). HUTT, MERRILL &
GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 1187-89.
189. The FDA defines autologous use as "the implantation, transplantation, infusion, or
transfer of human cells or tissue back into the individual from whom the cells or tissue were
recovered." 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3 (2016).
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into a syringe along with the antibiotic doxycycline and other
additives, and injecting the contents of the syringe into the patient's
injured area.190  The doctors formed Regenerative Sciences LLC
("Regenerative") to commercialize this practice.191  FDA officials
inspected Regenerative's facilities in 2009 and 2010 and found that its
laboratory operations did not conform to cGMP regulations.192 When
the FDA charged Regenerative with manufacturing and distributing
adulterated and misbranded biological drug products in violation of
section 301(k) of the FDCA and section 262(k) of the PHSA,193 the
defendant physicians responded that they were lawfully practicing
medicine within the state of Colorado and that the RegenexxTM
Procedure fell outside the FDA's regulatory purview.194
The district court quickly disposed of the defendants' argument
that the FDA lacks constitutional authority to regulate any aspect of
the practice of medicine.195  It reasoned that since the FDCA
provisions at issue require a direct nexus to interstate commerce,
agency action pursuant to its statutory authority necessarily falls
within the bounds of its Commerce Clause power.196 The case thus
presented a matter of statutory interpretation. The threshold
question was whether the defendants' cellular therapy was a "drug" as
defined by the FDCA or a "biological product" as defined by the
PHSA. 197 The court held that the stem cell therapy satisfied both the
statutory definition of a "drug" under the FDCA and the statutory
definition of a "biological product" under the PHSA198 and that the
190. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 878 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251-52 (D.D.C.
2012). Doxycline is added to prevent bacterial contamination of the stem cells. United States v.
Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
191. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
192. Id. at 252; see also 21 C.F.R. pts. 210 & 211 (cGMP regulations promulgated under
21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B) (2012)).
193. Most of the FDCA's provisions, including its manufacturing and labeling
requirements, are incorporated by reference into the PHSA. See Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at
1319 n.1 ("Because the PHSA simply incorporates the FDCA's substantive provisions by
reference, the scope of the FDCA's provisions is determinative of the reach of the PHSA's
provisions as well.").
194. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 254.
195. Id.
196. Id. (noting the prohibition against adulteration and misbranding stated in 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(k) applies only if a drug is held for sale "after shipment in interstate commerce").
197. Id. ("The question presented here is whether the Regenexxm Procedure constitutes
a drug (or biologic product) subject to FDA regulation or whether it is merely an intrastate
method of medical practice subject only to the laws of the State of Colorado.").
198. Id. at 255-57 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) & (C) (2012), which define "drug" to
mean "articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease" or "articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man," and 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(1) (2012), which defines a "biological product" as, inter alia, any
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RegenexxTM Procedure did not qualify for regulatory exemption from
the FDCA's drug provisions because the cultured stem cells were more
than minimally manipulated.199 It further found that the defendants
were subject to the FDCA because they held their cellular therapy out
for sale after shipment in interstate commerce.200 Consequently, the
district court ruled that the defendants violated the FDCA's
adulteration prohibition by failing to comply with cGMP regulations
and violated the FDCA's misbranding prohibition by not labeling their
cellular therapy "Rx only" and for failing to provide adequate
directions for use.201
The crux of the district court's decision was its determination
that the defendants' actions were directly connected to interstate
commerce. Section 331(k) of Title 21 of the United States Code
prolibits any act "with respect to, a . . . drug . .. if such act is done
while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) after
shipment in interstate commerce and results in such article being
adulterated or misbranded."2 02  Citing Evers, the court determined
that the RegenexxTM Procedure was "held for sale" within the meaning
of section 331(k).203 The defendants did not contest hat they held the
procedure out for sale to their patients.204 They argued, however, that
since the entire process of harvesting, culturing, and re-implanting
patients' stem cells took place within the state of Colorado, the
procedure did not meet section 331(k)'s "interstate commerce"
requirement.205 The court rejected this argument by noting that the
FDCA's expansive "drug" definition includes "articles intended for use
as a component of any article . . . ."206 The defendants added the
antibiotic doxycycline to the stem cell mixture prior to administering
it to patients, which rendered doxycycline a "component" of the
cellular therapy.207 Since the doxycycline indisputably was shipped
"blood, blood component or derivative, ... or analogous product ... applicable to the prevention,
treatment, or cure of a disease or condition of human beings").
199. Id. at 257-78. During the culturing process, the defendants added substances to the
stem cells that affected their growth and differentiation. The FDA concluded that this process
altered the cells' "relevant biological characteristics," and therefore the cells did not meet the
criteria for the regulatory exemption for HCT/Ps that are no more than "minimally
manipulated." See United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1321-22 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (concluding that the defendants failed to carry their burden of establishing that the
§ 1271.10 regulatory exemption applies to the Regenexx'M Procedure).
200. Regenerative Scis., 878 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59.
201. Id. at 259-60.
202. Id. at 258.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 259.
205. Id.
206. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(D) (2012)).
207. Id.
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from out of state to the defendants' Colorado facilities, the court
concluded that the RegenexxTM  Procedure met the "interstate
commerce" requirement.208
The district court rejected the defendants' contention that its
statutory interpretation contradicted legislative intent because
Congress did not intend the FDCA to regulate the practice of
medicine.209  The court drew a key distinction between clinical
activities that fall outside the scope of the FDA's authority and
activities that fall within the FDA's regulatory jurisdiction:
There is a difference between a licensed physician's use of an FDA-approved drug such
as doxycycline in an off-label way, which is permissible within the "practice of
medicine," and adding doxycycline to a cell product to be administered to patients,
which renders the latter a "drug" that has connections to interstate commerce. The
question of interstate commerce is not relevant to the first issue but controls the
second.2 10
Finding a "cognizable danger of a recurrent violation," the district
court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from
committing further violations of the FDCA's adulteration and
misbranding provisions.211
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's
summary judgment for the government and the permanent injunction
against the defendants.2 1 2 It found the defendants' assertion that the
FDA exceeded its statutory authority "wide of the mark" because the
focus of the agency's enforcement action was the stem cell mixture
itself, not the procedures used to administer the mixture.213 The court
reasoned that the FDCA's comprehensive regulatory scheme generally
applies to licensed healthcare practitioners, which is why physicians
and pharmacists who compound drugs in the course of their
professional practice must rely on specific statutory exemptions to
avoid FDA regulation.214 The appellate court further explained that
the defendants could not rely on the drug compounding exemption
because the exemption only covers drugs compounded using certain
208. Id. ("Courts have held that the 'interstate commerce' element is met if any
component of that drug moved in interstate commerce.").
209. Id. at 260-61.
210. Id. at 261.
211. Id. at 262-63.
212. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
213. Id. at 1319 ("That is, the FDA does not claim that the procedures used to administer
the Mixture are unsafe; it claims that the Mixture itself is unsafe.").
214. Id. at 1319-20 (finding the defendants' construction of the FDCA untenable because
it "would allow states to gut the FDCA's regulation of doctors, and thereby create an enormous




types of bulk drug substances.215 The stem cells at issue did not
qualify as bulk drug substances that were components of an
FDA-approved drug.2 16 Finally, it rejected the defendants' argument
that they should not be subject to the FDCA's misbranding provisions
because they produced the stem cell therapy for their own use.2 17 The
court distinguished this case from Evers by noting that the drug at
issue in Evers was FDA approved and thus Dr. Evers unquestionably
had the right to prescribe it for off-label use.2 1 8 In contrast, the
defendants' stem cell therapy had not been approved for any
therapeutic use.219 The D.C. Circuit therefore justified its finding of
FDA jurisdiction by the absence of a recognized drug compounding
exception coupled with the distinction from Evers regarding the
existence of FDA approval.
The D.C. Circuit's determination that the FDA has authority to
regulate the RegenexxTM Procedure as a drug stands on a remarkably.
thin reed. The court accepted the government's finding that the stem
cells were more than minimally manipulated because substances were
added to the cell culture that affected cell differentiation. But the
court left open the possibility that future defendants could challenge
this point with additional evidence.220 If providers can show that the
culturing process does not alter cells' relevant biological
characteristics, then, like autologous cord blood administration,221
autologous stem cell therapy should be exempt from drug regulation
and subject only to section 361 of the PHSA.
Furthermore, the defendants' conduct satisfied the statutory
interstate commerce requirement only because the doxycycline was
shipped into Colorado from out of state and added to the stem cells
prior to the mixture's administration to patients.222  Had the
doxycycline been manufactured in Colorado and shipped intrastate,
the FDA would have lacked a jurisdictional hook.22 3 Alternatively,
suppose the defendants had administered the doxycycline separately
215. Id. at 1323.
216. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 207.3(a)(4) (2016), which states that, to qualify as a "bulk
drug substance," an item must be "represented for use in a drug," and noting that there is no
evidence that the stem cells in the defendants' mixture are held out for use in any drug).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1324.
219. Id. at 1323-25 ("We will not broaden Evers to vitiate the FDCA's labeling
requirements in these circumstances.").
220. Id. at 1321-22 ("Because appellants concede that culturing [mesenchymal stem
cells] affects their characteristics and offer no evidence that those effects constitute only minimal
manipulation, they fail to carry [their burden of proofj as a matter of law.").
221. See Suski, supra note 182.
222. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1320.
223. Id.
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rather than mixing it with the stem cells in a single syringe. If the
RegenexxTM Procedure were modified to comprise two separate
injections-a first syringe of stem cells and a second syringe of
doxycycline-the FDA presumably would lose its regulatory authority
under the FDCA, even if the doxycycline were shipped from out of
state.224 In this case, the defendants would be prescribing doxycycline
for off-label use, an activity that the FDA lacks power to regulate
regardless of its connection to interstate commerce.225
The D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the misbranding
prohibition also elides the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Evers. In
holding that a physician who administers a prescription drug for an
off-label use is not required to provide adequate directions for such
use, the Evers court stressed that it was nonsensical to require a
physician to provide directions to himself.2 2 6 The logic behind this
argument does not turn on the drug's regulatory approval status.
While the FDA has a compelling public health reason to hold the
defendants liable for violating the FDCA's adulteration provisions in
failing to comply with cGMPs, its misbranding charge against
Regenerative was just as absurd as the one in Evers. Like Dr. Evers,
the defendants were not selling their stem cell therapy to patients for
self-medication or to other practitioners for administration to their
own patients.227  The policy rationale for enforcing the FDCA's
labeling requirements is simply absent where a licensed healthcare
professional both manufactures and administers a therapeutic
substance to his own patients, regardless of whether that substance
has been FDA approved.
Given this shaky basis for the FDA's misbranding charge, what
exactly would the defendants need to put on the mixture's label in
order to meet the agency's requirements? As noted by the D.C.
Circuit, since the mixture is a prescription drug, by definition it
cannot contain "adequate directions for [lay] use."2 2 8 The regulatory
exemption for prescription drugs requires the label to contain
"adequate information for use . . . under which practitioners .. . can
use the drug safely and for the purposes for which it was intended."229
Presumably, therefore, the RegenexxTM label must include its
indications, dosages, routes of administration, side effects, and other
necessary information to ensure that other physicians can provide it
224. Id. at 1319.
225. Id. at 1324.
226. United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1053 (5th Cir. 1981).
227. Regenerative Scis., 741 F.3d at 1323.
228. Id. at 1324.
229. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (2016).
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safely to patients. But if Regenerative were to add this information to
the mixture's label, the FDA could then assert a new misbranding
charge under 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) on the theory that the label's claims
are "false and misleading in any particular."230 This raises thorny
questions about he type and amount of safety and efficacy data the
FDA would require providers to produce in order to establish that a
stem cell therapy's labeling is not false and misleading. If the agency
were to pursue this path, it would more directly confront the
longstanding prohibition against federal interference with the practice
of medicine.231 It would also put itself on a collision course with the
First Amendment.232
2. 3D-Printed Drugs and Devices
Additive manufacturing, better known as 3D printing, is
another technological innovation that is poised to strain the bounds of
the FDA's regulatory authority. Although 3D printing has existed.
since the 1980s, the field has exploded in recent years as rapid
technological advances and substantially reduced prices for 3D
printers have created opportunities in a wide range of areas.233 To
accelerate progress in this emerging industry, in 2012 President
Obama launched the National Additive Manufacturing Innovation
Institute, an effort to provide infrastructure for 3D printing projects
and to foster collaboration among commercial entities, academia, and
the federal government.234
230. The government has invoked this provision to prohibit manufacturers' off-label
promotion in labeling. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 926-27 ("[T]he
government may allege a misbranding violation under section 301(a) or 301(k) [of the FDCA]
because the labeling is 'false or misleading in any particular' (502(a)), or fails to include
adequate directions for use' (502(0(1)), or both.").
231. See supra Part IV.
232. See Jeffrey K. Shapiro, Does FDA's Per Se Prohibition Against Off-Label Promotion
Have a Future? The Short Answer: No, FOOD & DRUG L. INST.'S UPDATE MAG. (Mar./Apr. 2016),
http://www.hpm.com/pdf/FDLI%20mar%20apr%202016%20jks%20off
%201abel.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZX4R-98B2;]; Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011);
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012); Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp.
3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Pacira Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-7055 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2015); Unitec
States v. Vascular Sols., Inc., 5:14-CR-00926 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2016).
233. Collean Davies, et al., 3D Printing of Medical Devices: When a Novel Technology
Meets Traditional Legal Principles, REED SMITH 2 (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://www.reedsmith.com/3D-Printing-of-Medical-Devices--When-a-Novel-Technology-Meets-
Traditional-Legal-Principles-09-09-2015/ [https://perma.cc/3SU8-VHYK] (noting that 3D printing
is "becoming a significant industry with tremendous innovative potential for many applications,
from dental and medical, to automotive, aerospace, military, fashion, food, eyewear, and
construction").
234. Steven K. Pollack, et al., FDA Goes 3-D, FDA VOICE (Aug. 15, 2013),
http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/08/fda-goes-3-d/ [https://perma.cc/A39L-QNW2].
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While the technical aspects vary with different types of
additive manufacturing, the basic concept of 3D printing is that
components are built up layer by layer on an extremely small scale.2 3 5
Additive manufacturing is essentially the inverse of traditional
subtractive manufacturing, which involves whittling down a starting
block of material to create the desired shape.236 A 3D printer produces
shapes based on data contained in an electronic file-usually a
computer aided design (CAD) file or an image file created by scanning
an object.237 Because the printer only uses that material necessary to
build objects that correspond to the electronic file, additive
manufacturing is more efficient and cost-effective than traditional
manufacturing.2 3 8 3D printers use a variety of different materials to
build fully integrated shapes that are not possible using conventional
manufacturing processes.239 Thus, this technology has the potential to
substantially disrupt conventional product supply chains, including
those in the pharmaceutical and medical device industries.
The FDA has already cleared at least eighty-five medical
devices that are produced using 3D printing technology.240 These
include products such as Oxford Performance Materials, Inc.'s
OsteoFab@ Patient-Specific Facial Device, a maxillofacial implant that
is created from an individual's magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) or
computerized tomography (CT) scan, and Zimmer Biomet Holdings'
Unite3DTm Bridge Fixation System, which uses 3D-printed
biomaterials and eliminates the need for plates, screws, and staples in
joint fusion surgery.241 Other examples of 3D-printed medical devices
that have been cleared by the FDA include hearing aids, skull plates,
hip cups, spinal cages, surgical instruments, and Invisalign@
braces.242
While medical applications of 3D printing have so far focused
predominantly on devices, the technology promises to revolutionize
the pharmaceutical sector, as well. In August 2015, the FDA made
235. Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three Dimensional Printing: The Converging Worlds of
Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 558-60 (2014).
236. Davies, et al., supra note 233, at 2-3.
237. Id. at 2.
238. Id. at 3.
239. Id.
240. Maya M. Eckstein & Kyle Sampson, How Will the FDA Regulate 3D Printing?,
INSIDE COUNSEL (Mar. 9, 2016), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2016/03/09/how-will-the-fda-
regulate-3d-printing [https://perma.cclYB3T-PD67] (explaining that almost all of the legally
marketed 3D-printed medical devices were cleared by the FDA via the 510(k) pathway and a
small number were authorized for emergency use, compassionate use, or via the custom device
exemption pathway).
241. Id.
242. Davies, et al., supra note 233, at 4-5.
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headlines when it announced the approval of Spritam, an epilepsy
treatment touted as the first 3D-printed drug ever approved by the
FDA. 2 4 3  Spritam's sponsor, Aprecia Pharmaceuticals, uses 3D
printing to produce a "fast-melt" pill that is easier to swallow than
tablets or capsules.244 The additive manufacturing process enables
physicians to administer precise doses of medication uniformly
calibrated to each patient's unique needs.24 5
3D-printed drugs and devices that are distributed through
traditional channels indisputably fall within the FDA's purview.
Changes in manufacturing processes alone do not affect the scope of
the FDA's regulatory jurisdiction. However, this technology gives
every individual who can afford to buy a 3D printer the ability to
become a manufacturer.2 4 6 Hospitals, physicians, and even patients
who purchase 3D printers can create their own individualized
products on-site, a dramatic departure from the traditional
distribution scheme whereby healthcare providers obtain identical,
mass-produced items in bulk from a conventional supplier.247 The
FDA may lack the statutory authority to regulate such local
production of customized medical products. Creators of 3D-printed
drugs and devices have several possible bases to challenge the
agency's regulatory authority. For instance, their activities may lack
a connection to interstate commerce248 or may constitute aspects of the
practice of medicine or the practice of pharmacy outside the bounds of
the FDA's regulatory jurisdiction.249
The FDA has taken steps to address 3D printing, but the full
regulatory implications of this disruptive technology remain
unexplored. A key unanswered question is if and when the agency
will designate 3D-printed products as "custom" devices. As amended
in 2012, section 520(b) of the FDCA provides that the requirements of
section 314 (performance standards) and section 515 (premarket
243. Robert J. Szczerba, FDA Approves First 3-D Printed Drug, FORBES (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertszczerba/2015/08/04/fda-approves-first-3-d-printed-drug
/#2ae6ld6c2c8a [https://perma.cc/4DXH-GJP4].
244. Dominic Basulto, Why It Matters That the FDA Just Approved the First 3D-Printed
Drug, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp
/2015/08/1 1/why-it-matters-that-the-fda-just-approved-the-first-3d-printed-drug/
[https://perma.cc/X5VS-GQFW].
245. Szczerba, supra note 243.
246. The FDA broadly defines a "manufacturer" as "any person who designs,
manufactures, fabricates, assembles, or processes a finished device." 21 C.F.R. § 820.3(o) (2016).
247. Basulto, supra note 244; see also Diana Alison, 3D Printing Reshapes Healthcare,
INFO. WEEK (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.informationweek.com/healthcare/mobile-and-
wireless/3d-printing-reshapes-healthcare/d/d-id/1113893 [https://perma.cc/BMK8-QF6A].
248. See supra Part II.
249. See supra Part III.
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approval) do not apply to a device that, to comply with an order of an
individual physician or dentist, necessarily deviates from an otherwise
applicable performance standard or premarket approval (PMA)
application.250 The custom device exemption applies only if the device
is not generally available for commercial distribution in finished form,
is designed to treat "a unique pathology or physiological condition,"
and is manufactured "on a case-by-case basis to accommodate the
unique needs" of either an individual patient or an individual
healthcare provider.251
3D-printed products may fit the criteria for the custom device
exemption, but it is not yet clear whether this is a viable regulatory
strategy for manufacturers seeking to avoid federal regulatory
requirements.2 5 2 The FDCA caps production of a custom device at five
per year "of a particular device type."2 5 3 Hence, the extent to which
additive manufacturers may rely on the custom device exception
critically turns on whether the FDA deems a 3D-printed product to
comprise its own distinct device type.
In October 2014, the FDA held a public workshop on 3D
printing for medical device makers, but regulatory policy issues were
expressly excluded from the discussion.254 The FDA made no further
public pronouncements on 3D printing until May 2016 when it issued
a draft guidance entitled "Technical Considerations for Additive
Device Manufacturers."255 While the draft guidance provides useful
insight into agency expectations regarding design, manufacturing, and
product testing, many questions remain unanswered. Notably, the
draft guidance lacks any information about the criteria that the FDA
will use to deem an entity a product manufacturer. The draft
guidance states, "point-of-care device manufacturing may raise
additional technical considerations," which suggests that point-of-care
250. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(b) (2012).
251. Id.
252. Eckstein & Sampson, supra note 240.
253. 21 U.S.C. § 360j(b)(2)(B).
254. Public Workshop - Additive Manufacturing of Medical Devices: An Interactive
Discussion on Medical Considerations of 3D Printing, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/downloadsfMedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM425399.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YBC7-HRHY] ("We are not going to be talking about regulatory policy at
all, that's going to be a whole separate discussion . . . . So if you guys ask us any hypothetical
questions, we're going to say either no or that will be for a different workshop. Today we just
want to be focused on technical considerations.") (opening remarks of Matthew Di Prima, PhD,
materials scientist within the FDA's Division of Applied Mechanics in the Office of Science and
Engineering Laboratories).
255. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Technical Considerations for Additive Device




manufacturing falls within the scope of the guidance.256 However, it is
unclear whether hospitals that own 3D printers will be considered
manufacturers subject to device requirements.2 57 As the agency works
to develop a comprehensive framework for 3D-printed products and
producers, it will be against a backdrop of lingering uncertainty about
the limits of its regulatory authority.
B. Unprecedented Patient Participation
The FDA's struggle to keep pace with substantial technological
advances in medical product development and distribution is
compounded by fundamental shifts in the dynamics between patients,
industry, and the agency. Historically, some patient groups have
sought to influence regulatory policy by submitting their views to the
FDA. An important example of sustained, successful patient advocacy
is the effort by activists in the 1980s and 1990s to accelerate access to
drugs to combat HIV/AIDS. 258 But patient involvement in healthcare
decision making has intensified to an unprecedented degree in recent
years. The success of companies such as 23andMe, which provides
direct-to-consumer genomic testing,259 and PatientsLikeMe, an online
community whose members self-organize to conduct research and
exchange medical information,260 reflects the growing prominence and
sophistication of contemporary participatory health initiatives.
The rise of an increasingly influential patient empowerment
movement has forced the FDA to significantly revise its review and
256. McKenzie E. Cato & Allyson B. Mullen, FDA Issues Much Anticipated Draft






258. See generally STEPHEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE: AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE
POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE (1996). See also U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Expanded Access and
Expedited Approval of New Therapies Related to HIV/AIDS (Aug. 7, 2012),
http://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Illness/HIVAIDS/Treatment/ucml34331.htm
[https://perma.cclVNU3-VWQB].
259. For an overview of 23andMe's genetic testing business and the FDA's efforts to
crack down on its direct-to-consumer service, see Anna B. Laakmann, The New Genomic
Semicommons, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1001, 1030-31 (2016).
260. See Straight Talk with... Jamie Heywood, 20 NATURE MED. 457, 457 (2014),
http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v20/n5/pdf/nm0514-457.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WPS-EKNX]
("What we get from the patients is essentially a clinical interview that asks about how the
patient is doing, the symptomology of their disease, what drugs they're taking, what novel
therapies they're trying, what supplements they're using and even lab values.").
2016] 321
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
approval processes.26 1 Congress mandated that the FDA incorporate
patient stakeholders into agency proceedings when it passed the Food
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012
(FDASIA). 262 Section 1137 of FDASIA directs the FDA to "develop and
implement strategies to solicit the views of patients during the
medical development process and consider the perspectives of patients
during regulatory discussions."263 The agency has developed several
patient engagement programs and activities in response to this
provision. For example, it has appointed over two hundred Patient
Representatives to participate on FDA Advisory Committees and
panels and in product review meetings.264 The agency has also taken
steps to systematically obtain and consider patient perspectives on
disease states, the benefits of their treatments, and the risks patients
are willing to accept for access to effective therapies.265
But some patient advocacy groups are not content o wait for
the FDA to revamp its policies and procedures. Nightscout, a project
developed by the parents of children with Type I Diabetes, offers a
striking illustration of a patient-led organization baldly challenging
the regulatory status quo.2 6 6 The goal of the Nightscout project is to
enable patients and caregivers to hack into FDA-cleared devices in
order to extract data and transfer them to the Internet, thereby
allowing remote monitoring of blood glucose levels.2 6 7 The project's
Facebook group grew from forty members to over 15,000 members in
eighteen months, prompting FDA scrutiny of Nightscout's efforts to
create do-it-yourself mobile technology for diabetes management.268
In meetings with Nightscout leaders, the FDA has expressed concerns
about the project's lack of infrastructure to systematically monitor and
261. See Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) Section
1137: Patient Participation in Medical Product Discussions Report on Stakeholder Views (2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForPatients/AboutlUCM486859.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJ43-AZ38]
[hereinafter FDASIA] (highlighting current FDA patient engagement programs and activities).
262. Pub. L. No. 112-44, 126 Stat. 993 (2012).
263. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-8c(a) (2012).
264. FDASIA, supra note 261, at 7.
265. Id. at 8-10 (summarizing the FDA Patient Network, Patient Reported Outcomes,
Patient Focused Drug Development initiative, Professional Affairs and Stakeholder Engagement
Staff, Patient Perspectives in Benefit-Risk Determinations for Medical Devices, Device Patient
Preference Initiative, and Patient Engagement Advisory Committee).
266. See Nightscout, Welcome to Nightscout (2016), www.nightscout.info
[https://perma.cc/7CB5-MKJL] (prominently displaying the organization's Twitter hashtag,
#WeAreNotWaiting, an explicit reference to members' impatience with current FDA regulatory
hurdles).
267. Id.
268. Jonah Comstock, In JAMA Editorial, Nightscout Opens up About Dealings with




measure the technology's safety and effectiveness.2 6 9 However, since
Nightscout gives away information and services for free,270 the agency
has limited statutory authority to proscribe the organization's
conduct.
The FDA can seize adulterated or misbranded articles, whether
or not they have traveled in interstate commerce.2 7 1  However, the
government cannot penalize or prosecute individuals who obtain
products that have traveled in interstate commerce, modify those
products, and then either use them or gratuitously share them with
others.272 Given these statutory constraints, the FDA lacks authority
to demand that the Nightscout community cease or scale back its
operations. Although Nightscout appears eager to maintain good
relations with the FDA, 2 7 3 other patient advocacy groups may opt o
take a more aggressive stance. If that happens, the agency will be
forced to confront the limits of its regulatory power to police
noncommercial patient-driven product development and
dissemination.
C. Policy Considerations
There are several potential responses to the increasingly
conspicuous gaps in the FDA's regulatory authority. Congress has
constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation
that expands the reach of the FDA's jurisdiction and gives the agency
express authority to ban the distribution of unapproved customized
products.2 74  However, this tactic would face significant, likely
insurmountable, political obstacles.275 Moreover, such an expansion of
269. Id.
270. Id. ("[Q]uestions have arisen about whether the Nightscout project and projects like
it should escape FDA regulation simply because they are given away for free rather than sold.").
271. See supra text accompanying notes 24-29.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31; see also HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN,
supra note 19, at 281 (discussing the case of United States v. Olsen, 161 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1947),
which held that the government could seize a misbranded device from a consumer's private
home, but noting that the government could not have penalized the appellee under FDCA §
301(k), because he did not hold the device for sale).
273. Comstock, supra note 268 (reporting that Nightscout has engaged with the FDA on
a regular basis with the hope of receiving regulatory approval of the project).
274. See supra text accompanying notes 8-15.
275. The wave of "right to try" laws enacted in states across the country in recent years
reflects widespread dissatisfaction with federal egulatory restrictions on access to experimental
therapies whose safety and efficacy have not yet been shown. See Julie Turkewitz, Patients Seek
'Right to Try' New Drugs, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015
/01/1 1/us/patients-seek-right-to-try-new-drugs.html?_r=0 [https://perma.ccF7S8-AH7Z]
(reporting that a string of states have passed or are considering laws that allow patients to
obtain drugs that have not yet been approved by the FDA).
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federal regulatory power may be unwise as a matter of policy. The
FDA is designed to regulate the production and sale of mass-market
articles distributed by nonprofessional manufacturers, not bespoke
medications delivered by licensed healthcare professionals to provide
individualized care to specific patients.276
A preferable approach is to adopt a flexible, multi-pronged
regulatory scheme based on principles of cooperative federalism.277
For instance, the FDA could establish a voluntary certification system
for healthcare facilities and organizations that produce customized
medical therapies, analogous to its program for outsourcing
compounding facilities.278 International standards for medical 3D
printing are being developed279 and should be incorporated into FDA
certification criteria. Alternatively, the FDA could craft a set of model
codes for customized medicine that are adopted and enforced at the
state level, patterned after the model Food Code that has been
adopted in all fifty states.280
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) should
also play a part in setting evidentiary benchmarks for demonstrating
the clinical utility of customized therapies. By identifying treatment
protocols that satisfy the medically "reasonable and necessary"
statutory standard for reimbursement under federal programs,281
CMS could buttress the FDA's efforts to ensure the safety and efficacy
of customized medicine. Such federal standards would complement
and reinforce state rules for professional licensure and standards of
care under tort law.
276. See United States v. Franck's Lab, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1245-46 (M.D. Fla.
2011) ("Because Congress appeared to be focused on the fact that manufacturing-unlike the
practice of pharmacy-was conducted by unlicensed, unregulated nonprofessionals, it seems
unlikely that it would have intended to subject professionally dispensed rugs to the same
regulatory scheme.").
277. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Jolene Forman, Allen Hopper & Sam Kamin,
Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (proposing
that states be permitted to opt out of the CSA's marijuana provisions, if they can show that they
have devised a regulatory scheme that addresses the federal government's safety concerns).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 151-68.
279. IEEE Standards Ass'n, P3333.2.5 - Bio-CAD File Format for Medical Three-
Dimensional (3D) Printing, IEEE.ORG (2016), http://standards.ieee.org/develop/project
/3333.2.5.html [https://perma.cc/4T2X-EYZU].
280. See HuTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 282; U.S. Food & Drug Admin.,
FDA Food Code (Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation
[RetailFoodProtection/FoodCode/ [https://perma.cc/EJ2D-GKSU].
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Congress created the federal regulatory scheme for medical
products in response to the industrialization of the biomedical
industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It
enacted the FDCA at a time when the artisanal model by which
healthcare providers prepared and administered therapies for
individual patients gave way to the mass production of off-the-shelf
products distributed to large patient populations.282 Today we are
experiencing a revival of the artisanal model as technological and
social changes spur a new type of customized medicine.
Comprehensive federal regulation remains essential to ensure high
product quality and safety standards. But the regulatory framework
must adapt to address scientific advances in areas such as stem cell
therapy and 3D printing, as well as the increasingly prominent role
that patients play in drug and device innovation. These fundamental
shifts in medical product development and distribution prompt a fresh
look at the FDA's role within our present healthcare regulatory
system.
282. See HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at 793 ("Long before there were
independent drug manufacturers, apothecaries, now known as pharmacists, compounded drugs
both for their own patients and in response to prescriptions of physicians. Companies engaged in
the manufacture and distribution of drugs did not emerge in the United States until the latter
half of the 19th century.").
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